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Olivier Jean Blanchard, Kenneth A. Froot, 
and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
When communism fell in Eastern Europe in 1989, the issue in most countries 
was not whether to go to a market economy but how to get there. Arguments 
ranged from the timing of stabilization, to the speed of price liberalization, to 
the design of privatization. 
The debate was  extraordinarily compressed in time, for several reasons. 
First, and most important, the new governments came into power with little 
preparation and had to formulate programs quickly in the face of  worsening 
economic conditions. During the late 1980s, the anti-Communist reformers 
certainly had little premonition that they would be in office (some of the new 
leaders came almost directly from jail), and the oppressive political milieu of 
the Communist period had prevented a full and open debate over economic 
options. As a result, the policy debate had typically been about long-term and 
philosophical issues rather than  short-term and programmatic issues. Also, 
microeconomic issues, such  as  privatization  and  demonopolization, rather 
than macroeconomic issues, tended to dominate the debate, and many  basic 
macroeconomic issues had hardly been discussed. The prevailing view among 
reformers at the end of the Communist period was that macroeconomic re- 
forms, such as price liberalization and convertibility of  the currency, would 
be gradual. 
Much of this changed with the emergence of the Solidarity-led government 
in Poland in September 1989. In view of the rapidly deteriorating macroeco- 
nomic conditions in Poland at the end of  1989, the debate shifted quickly to 
macroeconomic stabilization and exchange rate management. And, with wide- 
spread public support for fundamental change, the policy debate shifted in 
favor of radical reforms. This shift of  focus and emphasis culminated in the 
Balcerowicz Plan, introduced on 1 January 1990, which called for rapid price 
liberalization, sharp cutbacks in the budgetary deficit, tight monetary policy, 
and a quick opening of the economy, all this without waiting for privatization. 
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Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania subsequently followed Poland’s lead, 
while East Germany had a “shock” program of its own resulting from the eco- 
nomic and monetary union with West Germany in the summer of  1990. The 
situation was different in Hungary, where both the political and the economic 
transformations were less abrupt than elsewhere. Market reforms in Hungary 
had been under way  gradually since 1968, and the macroeconomic situation 
was adverse but not collapsing. Under these circumstances, the new govern- 
ment opted for a more gradual course, although also one that was based on 
stabilization and liberalization first, to be followed only later by privatization. 
Most of those countries have  now taken the key  steps of  substantial price 
liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization, or at least enough stabilization 
to arrest the slide to hyperinflation. The process has been controversial from 
the start and has raised many questions. Can orthodox stabilization measures 
work in an economy dominated by state ownership? Can the lessons of stabili- 
zation in other parts of  the world be transferred to the socialist economies? 
Can successful stabilization precede privatization and demonopolization of in- 
dustry? These questions remain controversial. But they largely concern the 
past. East European governments are now turning their attention to the prob- 
lems of privatization and restructuring. Here, the very scope of systemic trans- 
formation is such that there are few historical experiences on which to rely, 
Some apparent guideposts, such as privatization in Western countries, can be 
more misleading than helpful. Other historical cases, such as postwar recon- 
struction in Western Europe, provide at best fuzzy guides. The problem in 
Eastern Europe is not just to rebuild but to transform. Resources locked up in 
heavy industry must be reoriented toward light industry, housing construction, 
and services. Enterprises organized for a planned economy must be restruc- 
tured in order to be responsive to market signals. Governments must also create 
the right incentives for economic actors during the transition period. This is 
proving difficult. 
The purpose of this NBER conference, held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
in the spring of 1992, was to take stock, to identify common progress, common 
difficulties, and tentative solutions. The conference was divided into two parts, 
which correspond to volumes 1 and 2, respectively: (1) looking at the expe- 
rience  of  specific countries  (Poland, Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Germany, 
Slovenia, and the former Soviet Union), with an emphasis on macroeconomic 
policies and performance, and (2) looking at the problems of  restructuring, 
from fiscal reform, to labor market structure, to the design of privatization and 
of bankruptcy mechanisms, to the role of foreign direct investment. 
One of the aims of the conference was to draw on both the experience of 
those who have shaped or closely followed events in Eastern Europe and the 
expertise of those who, while not having been involved in the process of transi- 
tion, were familiar with the particular issues at hand. This mix is reflected in 
the set of papers presented here. 
A theme clearly emerges from the two volumes. The private sector is grow- 3  Introduction 
ing fast and filling many of the holes left by  the previous Soviet-type econo- 
mies. By contrast, the transformation of the large state firms is proving slow 
and difficult. This is not so much because they were in worse shape than ex- 
pected as because privatization has been slower than expected, leaving those 
firms with neither the incentives nor the tools to restructure. The future of 
reform depends on the success of the delicate balancing act between growth of 
the private sector and rationalization of the state sector that governments have 
to perform. The newly emerging private sector is not yet large enough or wide 
enough to bring success alone. The state sector must be cut down to size, made 
more efficient through privatization and restructuring, before its inertia bank- 
rupts the process of transition. 
Volume 1: Country Studies 
The countries of Eastern Europe can, for our purposes, be roughly divided 
into three groups. The first includes the major countries of Central Europe, in 
which there has been generally strong support for reform and, until recently, 
few redefinitions of borders. Those countries have already gone through stabi- 
lization and price liberalization and are now proceeding with privatization and 
restructuring. The second group includes  just one country, the former East Ger- 
many, where the resources and the role of West Germany are so overwhelming 
as to lead to a radically different adjustment process. The third group includes 
those countries that have to struggle with both less support for reform and the 
redefinition of borders. This includes the states born out of both the former 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. The conference focused on both the 
experience of Slovenia, a new state born out of Yugoslavia, and the start of the 
reform process in the former Soviet Union. 
Reform in Central Europe 
Reform in Central Europe is the topic of the first four papers. The first is by 
Michael Bruno, who identifies both similarities and differences in the reform 
experience of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Ex- 
cept for Hungary, which has pursued a stop-and-go limited reform process for 
most of  the past twenty years, reform in  those countries is a recent process. 
The first one to implement a full-fledged stabilization and liberalization plan 
was Poland, in January 1990. The others followed in early 1991. The experi- 
ence of Poland is then reviewed in detail by Andrew Berg and Olivier Blanch- 
ard, that of Czechoslovakia by  Karel Dyba and Jan Svejnar, and that of Hun- 
gary by Kemal Dervi? and Timothy Condon. From these four papers, one can 
draw the following lessons: 
1. In all countries, stabilization has been associated with a sharp initial de- 
crease in measured output. While there are serious problems of measurement, 
the sign of the movement is unambiguous, although the scale is not. An im- 
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among possible causes, including mismeasurement (especially underreporting 
of the new private sector), the decline of previously subsidized and protected 
sectors, the cyclical effects of monetary stabilization, and the collapse of trade 
arrangements within the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), 
especially between the East European countries and the Soviet Union. For 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, stabilization and the collapse of the 
CMEA coincide, making it difficult to allocate blame. But the decline of output 
in Poland in  1990, before the major collapse of  the CMEA, suggests an im- 
portant role of stabilization and also mismeasurement. Contrary to some ex- 
pectations and fears, the decline in output appears to be due not to supply 
disruptions but rather to a demand contraction. 
2. In all countries, stabilization and price liberalization have led to a large 
price adjustment. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, there was a large jump in 
the price level at the point of price liberalization. In some countries, inflation 
has since tapered off; in others, it is still running at 2-5  percent a month. The 
initial price adjustment was higher than initially forecast, but it is not clear that 
much more has been at work than the passthrough of cost increases that were 
also larger than expected. Berg and Blanchard argue that, in the case of Poland, 
the price increase can be more than fully attributed to cost increases, counter 
to the idea that price liberalization allowed monopolistic enterprises to raise 
their markups over costs. Bruno raises the possibility that, in some countries, 
the large initial devaluation may have contributed to the initial inflation. 
3. In all countries, there has been some shift of export markets from the East 
to the West. One of the most controversial elements of the “big bang” in Poland 
and elsewhere has been the rapid opening of the economy. This trade liberal- 
ization typically embodied several steps, including a steep devaluation, fol- 
lowed by  convertibility of the currency on current account; an elimination of 
most quantitative trade restrictions; and the imposition of relatively low tariff 
rates. One of the goals of the rapid liberalization was to end the “anti-export’’ 
bias of the old regime, in which exporters were subject to a hugely overvalued 
exchange rate as well as many other restrictions. The second goal was to intro- 
duce international competition into domestic markets that were typically oli- 
gopolistic in market structure. One wide fear in Eastern Europe was that qual- 
ity of production was so low that “there would be nothing to sell in the West.” 
These fears have  not materialized. In  fact, exports to the West  have  grown 
rapidly and have helped compensate for the very sharp decline in trade with 
the Soviet Union. 
4.  Implementing privatization has proved  harder than expected. In  most 
countries,  substantial  progress  has  been  made  in  privatizing  small-  and 
medium-scale firms. But privatization of large firms is still largely in the fu- 
ture, for many reasons. Parliaments have  insisted on extensive involvement, 
making the process more democratic but also cumbersome. Various stakehold- 
ers have had strong incentives to oppose or sabotage particular schemes. Initial 
schemes, often modeled on Western ones, have proved unworkable, or work- 5  Introduction 
able only at very low speeds. Countries are now experimenting with a variety 
of more radical schemes. Poland is preparing for mass privatization, through 
the  creation of  investment funds as  financial intermediaries. Hungary  has 
shifted to a system with more reliance on individual initiative and only ex post 
control by the state. Czechoslovakia has embarked on the most ambitious plan, 
a voucher system with auctions, for about one-fourth of all large state firms. 
Dyba and Svejnar give an insightful discussion of the benefits and dangers of 
the voucher plan. 
5. Largely as a result of slow privatization, there has been less restructuring 
than was expected and than is needed. In many countries, and particularly in 
Poland, workers have gained substantial rights of governance within the enter- 
prise and in many cases have operated with shorter and shorter horizons. Firms 
have decreased employment by  less than output, leading to declines in labor 
productivity. Despite the presence of government incomes policies in all coun- 
tries, wages  have  increasingly  appropriated revenues, and profits  have  de- 
clined. In the presence of constraints on credit to state firms, firms in difficulty 
have often relied on forced interenterprise credit. Bankruptcy laws have been 
little used for several reasons: many creditors are now hostages to borrowers; 
banks are state owned, with few incentives to press bankruptcy proceedings; 
the bankruptcy laws are difficult to apply; and creditors, debtors, and the courts 
have little experience. The credibility of the hard budget constraint is and will 
be tested for some time to come. Reading the papers in these two volumes, one 
senses different degrees of pessimism among the authors, with somewhat more 
pessimism regarding Poland than Hungary. Nonetheless, given the sketchy in- 
formation available, it is difficult to judge whether the different nuances add 
up to real variations among countries. Data comparisons between Hungary and 
Poland, for example, do not  suggest any  notable differences in  macroeco- 
nomic performance. 
6. In all countries, the private sector has done very well. In the nonagricul- 
tural economy, Poland’s  private sector now  represents around 30 percent of 
total employment, up from 13 percent at the start of reform. Including agricul- 
ture, almost half of Polish GNP is already produced in the private sector. Most 
of the growth has been in services and trade, two sectors repressed under the 
previous system. Some of  it has been in industry, and some signs are very 
encouraging. At the end of  1991, private exports accounted for 20 percent of 
total exports in Poland; in Hungary, 50 percent of  exports was accounted for 
by firms with fewer than fifty workers. Nevertheless, because of lack of know- 
how, of entrepreneurs, and of a competent banking system, new private firms 
remain for the most part very small businesses; it is clear that the new private 
sector cannot by  itself be counted on to replace the state sector. The papers 
point to interesting differences in private-sector growth. In Czechoslovakia, 
private-sector growth appears to have been much faster in the Czech lands than 
in Slovakia, leading to much higher unemployment in Slovakia. Variations are 
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cept for high-unemployment Lodz) and higher unemployment in the rural 
areas. 
7. Two years into reform, most governments face similar short-run issues. 
Reform fatigue tends to set in, making it harder to pass legislation with large 
redistributive implications. Most governments are faced with chronic deficit 
problems, coming primarily from the declining revenues from the profit tax on 
state enterprises. In the short run, they must deal with the fiscal crisis, until 
revenues from the new taxes come on line. But, more fundamentally, they must 
change the behavior of state firms. Even if the current privatization schemes 
proceed on schedule, it is not clear that the decentralized ownership that they 
may  generate will be sufficient to bring about restructuring. Clarification of 
bankruptcy rules is essential. So is the reform of the banking system, an issue 
discussed at some length by  Bruno. And so is maintaining the credibility of 
the hard budget constraint: even profit-maximizing owners have an incentive 
not to pay  taxes or not to repay loans if  they think that there are no risks in 
doing so. 
The Absorption of the Former East Germany 
The experience of the former East Germany, which is reviewed by Rudiger 
Dornbusch and Holger Wolf, differs in two major ways from that of other Cen- 
tral European countries. First, firms in the former East Germany have been 
pressed to pay  wages close to those current in West  Germany. Second, the 
former East Germany is benefiting from an infusion of  West German know- 
how, finance, and transfers on a scale unavailable to other countries. 
The first issue taken up by Dornbusch and Wolf is that of conversion of the 
ostmark into the deutsche mark, at a one-to-one exchange rate. Even though 
most observers concur that the conversion took place at a hugely overvalued 
exchange rate for the ostmark, Dornbusch and Wolf argue that the rate of con- 
version probably made little difference to the macroeconomic outcome. In par- 
ticular, given the implicit commitment of the German government and the pri- 
vatization agency, the Treuhand, to absorb losses of  firms for some time to 
come, the drive for wage parity was probably unavoidable and not very much 
affected by  the official rate of conversion. In fact, East Germany wages rose 
sharply in  nominal  terms after the conversion of  ostmark wage rates into 
deutsche mark wage rates, suggesting that the conversion itself was  not the 
source of the wage pressures in East Germany. 
Dornbusch and Wolf then document the extent of the drop in production in 
East Germany. Industrial production was down by  54 percent in 1990 and by 
another 20 percent in 1991. In effect, very few products are competitive at the 
existing wages. At the same time, transfers from the West to the East amounted 
to 73 percent of East Germany GDP in 1991. The high transfer payments there- 
fore are supporting the high wages and consumption levels, despite the lack of 
competitiveness at those wage rates. 
Dornbusch and Wolf then turn to the actions of the Treuhand, which at the 7  Introduction 
beginning assumed 95 percent of the enterprise sector and was given the task 
of privatization. Its strategy has been to look for single buyers, preferably with 
expertise in the given sector, and to put weight not only on price but also on 
employment and investment commitments. This has led the Treuhand to dis- 
mantle some of the larger Kombinate, in order to make the pieces more attrac- 
tive, and to be more discretionary in its choice of buyer than auction systems 
would have been. Progress has been fast, but, as is documented in the paper, tax 
breaks and debt relief have made some of these sales very costly for German 
taxpayers. Earlier studies have suggested that East Germany could address its 
lack of competitiveness by putting in place wage subsidies that would phase 
out automatically over time. Alternatively, Dornbusch and Wolf  suggest an- 
nouncing an end to subsidies for jobs and the enforcement of bankruptcy rules 
thereafter, saying that what is important is to “protect people, not jobs.” It is, 
however, an open question whether the German government can actually com- 
mit to a fixed timetable for removing subsidies, especially in cases of  large 
firms in regions with high unemployment. 
Dornbusch and Wolf conclude that the reform is likely to prove a success, 
albeit a very costly one. In view of the size of the transfers from West to East 
Germany, they wonder whether Central European countries will be able to suc- 
ceed, whether the much more depreciated exchange rate (and lower wages) 
will be sufficient to offset the lack of transfers. 
Creating New States: Slovenia and the Former Soviet Union 
According to the paper by  Boris Pleskovic and Jeffrey Sachs, Slovenia’s 
recent experience in achieving political and economic independence offers les- 
sons for the nineteen other new countries that have emerged out of the former 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Slovene independence from Yugosla- 
via was achieved in steps during the period January 1991-October 1991. By 
the end of  this process, on 8 October 1991, Slovenia introduced its own cur- 
rency, the Slovene tolar, thereby becoming the first of the new states to achieve 
monetary independence. Subsequently, it stabilized the economy and carried 
out fundamental economic and institutional reforms. This progress was accom- 
plished despite difficult circumstances, including the Yugoslav civil war and 
the nearly complete loss of the former Yugoslav market. 
The basic idea of  the monetary reform was straightforward. All bank ac- 
counts and domestic wages, prices, and other contracts were to be converted 
automatically from dinars to the new currency, the tolar, on a one-to-one basis. 
The currency in circulation was to be physically converted during a short pe- 
riod of time. The new currency was to be the sole legal tender after conversion 
and was  to trade freely with international currencies on a convertible basis 
and also to float freely against the Yugoslav dinar. The implementation of the 
monetary reform was carried out during 7-10  October 199  1, according to plan, 
although some vestiges of the old multiple exchange rate system remained for 
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The most urgent motivation for the monetary reform was to protect the Slo- 
vene economy from hyperinflation, a fate expected for the Yugoslav dinar. As 
it turned out, these expectations were correct. Yugoslav inflation has grown 
very rapidly since October 1991, reaching 100 percent per month in June 1992. 
In contrast, in Slovenia, monthly inflation peaked at 21.5 percent in the month 
of conversion and since then has fallen gradually, to 5.1 percent in April 1992 
and to 1.2 percent in August 1992. 
Slovenia has also been successful in other areas of macroeconomic stabiliza- 
tion and trade liberalization. It carried out a tax reform and achieved a slight 
budget surplus in 1991. Exports to the West increased, and the economy expe- 
rienced a trade and balance-of-payments surplus both in 1991 and in the first 
half of 1992. The decline in industrial output continued in 1992, but at a slower 
rate than in the last quarter of  1991. The unemployment rate reached around 
11 percent in early 1992. As elsewhere, progress on privatization and financial 
restructuring has been very slow. 
According to Pleskovic and Sachs, there are several lessons to be gained 
from Slovenia’s experience. First, the experience shows that it is possible to 
move  quickly  on  macroeconomic  stabilization  with  the  help  of  a  well- 
conceived monetary reform. Second, convertibility (at least trade transactions) 
can and should be introduced  from the beginning  of  the monetary reform. 
Third, technical work on the conversion can be done quickly. Fourth, trade will 
reorient itself to new markets, as soon as sufficient opening of the economy 
occurs. Fifth, as in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, Slovenia’s 
experience also shows the risk of becoming bogged down in a protracted priva- 
tization debate. 
At the time of the conference, reform had barely started in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) and was taking place within the context of a collapse not only of 
the relations between republics but also of  the central structure within each 
republic.  After reviewing  the past, in particular  the New  Economic Policy 
(NEP), Stanley Fischer focuses on the two issues that are making reform in the 
FSU harder than elsewhere. 
Macroeconomic stabilization  requires a  firm grip on the budget  and on 
money creation, but that firm grip is present in neither case. Taxes collected at 
the local level are often not being transferred to the center. The central bank, 
sometimes under pressure from the Parliament or the government, is willing to 
let credit to state firms increase rather rapidly, making stabilization more diffi- 
cult. Thus, as of the time of this writing, the budget deficit is large and infla- 
tion high. 
Privatization is nevertheless proceeding. The collapse of the center has left 
managers de facto in charge of firms (unlike in Poland, workers in the FSU 
have little  authority  within  the enterprises).  Fischer argues that Russia has 
learned from the problems of privatization in other East European countries. 
Current privatization plans recognize the de facto stakeholders, so as to enroll 9  Introduction 
their support. He suggests a two-track privatization plan, one for small firms 
and one for larger firms, the latter encouraging self-privatization with approval 
by the privatization agency. 
Fischer then turns to the relations between republics. He argues that, to un- 
derstand current developments, one must understand the role of Russia as the 
leader and the sheer difficulty the other republics have taking steps on their 
own, such as creating their own currencies. He discusses the pros and cons and 
the ways of  introducing different currencies. He argues for the creation of  a 
payments union, whether or not republics move to the adoption of convertibil- 
ity and their own currency. 
Volume 2: Restructuring 
With the country papers in volume 1 having provided the context, the papers 
in volume 2 then turn to the particular issues. These include labor market insti- 
tutions, public finance, privatization, bankruptcy reform, and foreign trade. We 
discuss them in turn. 
Organizing Labor Market Relations 
Should East European  countries move toward a system of centralized  or 
decentralized bargaining? Should institutions be different during the process 
of transition? These are the questions taken up by Richard Freeman. Given that 
we do not have the answers to those questions even for Western countries, 
Freeman emphatically refuses to make specific recommendations. But his pa- 
per nevertheless provides a useful framework within which to think about the 
issues. 
Freeman first looks at existing institutions and points out that the old Com- 
munist unions are doing well. In Czechoslovakia, the old unions have been 
taken over by  new leaders. In Poland, Bulgaria,  and Albania, old and new 
unions coexist; in Hungary and Romania, new unions coexist with breakaways 
from the old ones. Old unions are doing well because of the advantages of 
incumbency, the large resources that they have been able to keep, the organiza- 
tional weakness of  the new unions, and the benign neglect of the government. 
Thus, the initial situation in labor relations as well as in most other places is 
not one of a tabula rasa. 
Freeman then looks at changes in the labor market. Wage dispersion is in- 
creasing, usually in a way related to differences in profitability across enter- 
prises. Unemployment is increasing but is not yet felt to be a major hardship 
by the population as a whole. The private sector is growing and the state sector 
contracting. Freeman argues, both informally and with the help of a simple 
model, that the main risk to reform from the labor market is that an increas- 
ingly large group of workers will feel that they will lose from reform and at 
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negotiation and organization that reduce this risk, for example, unions that 
cover both the contracting and the expanding sectors, will increase the chances 
of success of reform. 
Achieving Fiscal Reform 
Three papers deal with fiscal reform. Roger Gordon looks at fiscal policy in 
the transition and the design of a new fiscal structure. Peter Diamond looks at 
the setting up of pension funds. Alain de Combrugghe and David Lipton look 
at the concrete problems faced by Polish fiscal policymakers today, as a case 
study of the budget in transition economies. 
Roger Gordon emphasizes two aspects of prereform fiscal policy. The first 
is that the structure of taxes differs considerably from that of Western counter- 
parts, in particular, with the large role played by  profit taxes. The second is 
that, as soon as the transition process starts and prices start playing a role, all 
the distortions implicit in the tax system are activated. If  not changed, the 
heavy emphasis on enterprise profits, together with the steady decline in the 
profits of state firms in the trahsition, is a recipe for fiscal crisis, as has indeed 
occurred in a number of countries. This problem, together with the many dis- 
tortions of the tax system, implies that fiscal reform should be high on the 
reform agenda; distortions can derail the reform process. 
After looking at the institutional constraints, including the lack of a reliable 
accounting system, the difficulty of taxing much of the private sector, and the 
difficulties in enforcing tax collection, Gordon recommends the replacement 
of  both turnover and profit taxes by  a value-added tax. Given the relatively 
small dispersion of most incomes, he even suggests that a value-added tax may 
for a while be an  acceptable substitute for an income tax. Gordon suggests first 
changing from the turnover tax to a value-added tax on state firms, a change 
that can be achieved rapidly, and then introducing a value-added tax on private 
firms, a move that will take longer. 
The transition economies of Eastern Europe are surely not first-best econo- 
mies. Thus, many proposals have suggested offsetting the various externalities 
and distortions by  taxes and subsidies. In the last part of  his paper, Gordon 
discusses a number of such proposals, from tax holidays to the design of unem- 
ployment benefit systems. There is no simple punchline here, but an informed 
and useful discussion. 
One of the largest components of the fiscal reform is the pension and disabil- 
ity system. Peter Diamond’s paper examines pension reform proposals in Po- 
land, the country that has gone the furthest toward developing a new system. 
As with the overall fiscal situation, the status of  the pension system as the 
Communist regime collapsed was highly problematic. The Polish system was 
a defined-benefit system, with benefits based on years of service and earnings 
in the last twelve months of work. As Diamond argues, this structure presents 
a number of incentive and compliance problems and is likely to be inappropri- 
ate for a capitalist economy with voluntary (and variable) employment. (To 11  Introduction 
complicate transitional matters, no records are currently being kept for earn- 
ings prior to each employee’s last year of work.) Furthermore, the current struc- 
ture provides for only a very low level of income for many current and prospec- 
tive retirees, and there is little operating room in the overall fiscal position, 
It is in this environment that the Poles are considering revamping their pen- 
sion system. Diamond explores various implications of the current proposal, 
which has three critical features: first, it would provide for a social pension 
system with initial benefits of up to 120 percent of the national average wage; 
second, it would mandate a ceiling on total (social plus private) benefits of 250 
percent of  the national average wage; and, third, it would create a privately 
funded system for benefits in between 120 percent and 250 percent of the na- 
tional average wage. 
As both the United States and Chile provide models for advanced, privately 
funded, defined-contribution pension systems, Diamond draws lessons from 
these cases. He considers in  detail some of the key differences between pri- 
vately run, defined-contribution plans and publicly run plans. The most im- 
portant of these include the effects that changes in pension expenditures have 
on nonpension parts of the government budget, the pros and cons of having a 
competitive group of  privately managed pension funds (as opposed to a cen- 
tralized  fund), and  the  transition difficulties involved in  establishing fully 
funded plans. 
Diamond also discusses the particular difficulties of  finding channels for 
pension savings in a country with poorly developed capital markets. In  some 
respects, forced pension saving mandated by  the government may be consider- 
ably less efficient than private savings, which may not need the same degree 
of financial intermediation. Diamond explores many other considerations, such 
as implications for corporate governance and management oversight and the 
feasibility of regulating privately sponsored retirement plans. 
De Crombrugghe and Lipton look at the difficulties of managing the fiscal 
budget before, during, and  after the transition to a decentralized economy. 
Their specific focus is on Poland, but it is striking how  widely relevant the 
discussion is for any country in transition. The paper begins with a description 
of  the pressures on Poland’s budget as the Communist regime collapsed. De- 
spite sharp decreases in revenues, the budget still averaged a 3 percent surplus 
in 1990. De Crombrugghe and Lipton argue that this was the result of  four 
factors: a one-time paper profit windfall, leading to temporarily high measured 
profit; the sharp cut in subsidies associated with the price liberalization facet 
of the reform program; the reduction in external debt service; and a reduced 
level of government investment spending. 
However, new budgetary pressures emerged. Over time, the immediate im- 
provement in enterprise tax revenues vanished, as some of  the capital stock 
became useless at market prices and with the collapse of the CMEA, as further 
wage increases in the state-owned sector reduced profits, and as many  new 
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tem is being put together, but it will take time to eliminate loopholes and im- 
prove compliance. On the expenditure side, spending on unemployment insur- 
ance and social security benefits has begun to rise rapidly. 
De Crombrugghe and Lipton emphasize that these budgetary pressures will 
continue in the years ahead. Public investment is badly needed to clean up 
severe environmental degradation and to shore up an infrastructure that is inad- 
equate for a growing economy. Recapitalization of  the banks (whose assets 
include a sizable proportion of  bad loans) will also create demands on the 
budget. Deficit financing for these needs may be desirable if bond finance (do- 
mestic or foreign) rather than monetary finance can be tapped. 
The authors emphasize the magnitude of the short-run dangers. Demands 
on  the budget  will  grow much  more rapidly than  either financing or tax- 
revenue-raising programs. There will be a strong near-term temptation to mon- 
etize deficits, which must be resisted if  inflation targets are to be achieved. 
Existing taxes, such as “dividends” (a tax on enterprise assets), should be used 
actively until more flexibility is developed. The task of  reinventing fiscal ex- 
penditure and revenue programs is immense and is one that every East Euro- 
pean economy currently faces. 
Accelerating Privatization 
Three papers in volume 2 address what is probably the single most formid- 
able obstacle facing Eastern Europe in its transition to capitalism-privatiza- 
tion. As the privatization process unfolds across Eastern Europe, it is clear that 
the experience across countries will be highly varied. In general, privatization 
will take place amid prolonged confusion about the identity of owners (includ- 
ing past owners), the rights of managers and workers, and the role of the gov- 
ernment. While, in Germany, the Treuhand rapidly sells thousands of East Ger- 
man enterprises to West  German firms, the other countries will necessarily 
confront a period of  conflicting claims among various stakeholders in state 
property. Large state-owned firms will certainly pose the greatest challenges, 
as they present a complex web of overlapping claims for residual control rights 
and no easy answers. 
This diversity of claims is well illustrated by Russia, where existing control 
rights are among the most poorly defined in Eastern Europe. Andrei Shleifer 
and Robert Vishny argue that the first hurdle in accomplishing Russian priva- 
tization will be to resolve ambiguous and conflicting ownership claims among 
various enterprise stakeholders. The state and (what is left of) the central min- 
istries, local governments and bureaucrats, managers, and workers all have 
some powers of residual control and therefore some bargaining strength. Each 
of these groups must somehow be either accommodated or disenfranchised if 
privatization is to go forward. The paper gives a sense of the power positions 
of these groups by tracing the evolution of de fact0 ownership claims since the 
collapse of central planning. Until the 1988 reforms, central bureaucrats had a 
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cal assertions to the contrary). Since that time, the situation has been nearly 
completely reversed. 
Shleifer and Vishny point out that the presence of such imprecisely defined 
control rights leads to the failure of the Coase theorem. That is, under current 
circumstances, there is no reason to think that negotiations among interested 
parties will produce an efficient allocation and end use of  enterprise assets. 
Interest groups may have an incentive to undertake destructive actions, block 
moves away from the status quo, or roll their own brand of  “spontaneous” 
privatization, in which management and workers “buy” enterprises by bribing 
local officials and ignoring control claims of the center. Such spontaneous pri- 
vatizations are technically illegal but can often be accomplished quickly be- 
cause they respect the claims of  most stakeholder groups. The resulting con- 
centrated management buyout (MB0)-type  ownership structure may produce 
relatively efficient, if  inequitable, economic outcomes (although Shleifer and 
Vishny  question whether such structures give too much control to workers). 
However, the main disadvantage of  spontaneous privatization is the political 
dangers that it brings. Spontaneous transactions are likely to be perceived as 
unfair because they occur at very low prices and primarily benefit the old- 
guard incumbent managers and nomenklatura. 
Shleifer and Vishny suggest that a Russian program of  rapid, broad-scale 
commercialization could help shut down spontaneous privatizations and set 
the stage for a smoother privatization process. Commercialization entails the 
conversion of a state enterprise into a state-owned  joint-stock company, subject 
to the normal commercial law for joint-stock companies and governed by  a 
normal supervisory board (or board of directors) rather than by a ministry or a 
workers’ council. The charter of  the new joint-stock companies would spell 
out the rights and responsibilities of  management and the supervisory board 
and would put legal constraints on self-dealing and conflicts of interest of the 
managers. 
A program of comprehensive commercialization could also reduce corrup- 
tion by  stripping local governments and bureaucrats of their ability to dictate 
privatization outcomes. However, commercialization may  be difficult to ac- 
complish as it is likely to be opposed by managers to the extent that it reduces 
their bargaining power. A successful commercialization program is therefore 
likely to require the immediate transfer of  some of  the enterprises’ shares to 
management and workers. It remains to be seen whether the center has suffi- 
cient power to mandate and execute a large-scale commercialization program, 
although it will try to do so. Of course, for large, capital intensive firms, spon- 
taneous privatization is not really an option; for these enterprises some form 
of top-down process that begins with commercialization will be necessary. 
As Andrew Berg’s paper points out, a policy of mandatory commercializa- 
tion from above was briefly attempted by the first post-Communist government 
in Poland in early 1990 but soon abandoned. Workers’ councils, which gained 
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the approach. As a consequence, Poland’s post-Communist governments have 
so far treated commercialization as a voluntary measure, to be carried out on 
an enterprise-by-enterprise basis, as each firm is prepared for privatization. 
Subsequent to  commercializing, some  firms  have  been  sold  to  investors 
through IPOs (initial public offerings) and through trade sales to other busi- 
nesses, both domestic and foreign. Some firms have been corporatized in prep- 
aration for Poland’s Mass Privatization Program, described below. 
An  alternative privatization track, known in  Poland as “liquidation,” has 
been far more extensively used, having already been selected by  firms repre- 
senting about 10 percent of  the work force. Under the liquidation approach, 
the firm ends its existence as a state enterprise, and the assets of the enterprise 
are then made available to the workers and management in a lease-buyback 
arrangement.  Liquidation  has  been  particularly  popular  for  small-  and 
medium-sized firms with relatively low  capital intensity. There is as yet  no 
established privatization track that has been widely used by the large Polish en- 
terprises. 
Liquidation, which is a bottom-up process  that respects most  enterprise 
stakeholders, has similarities with the spontaneous privatizations in Russia and 
Poland, in that assets end up with the “insiders” (workers and management). 
The difference is that liquidation is a legal process that is monitored and regu- 
lated, with the result that a wide cross section of  workers and management, 
rather than a few nomenklatura managers, ends up with ownership rights. In 
this way, the liquidation track also seems to have solved the potential political 
problems posed by  spontaneous privatizations. Significantly, it appears that 
firms that undertake these liquidation privatizations often engage in significant 
and beneficial restructuring. 
This is not to say, however, that privatization through liquidation is moving 
quickly enough. Berg’s paper explores many of the reasons why privatization 
generally has been difficult and delayed in Poland. For liquidations in particu- 
lar, the approvals process (which includes the Ministry of Privatization and the 
responsible branch ministry) can be painstakingly slow.  Individual bureau- 
crats, concerned with the criminal liabilities that arise if there is impropriety 
or the appearance of  impropriety anywhere in a transaction, have little incen- 
tive to push privatization forward. This is, of course, an inevitable cost of the 
extra transparency compared with spontaneous privatizations. 
The progress on mass privatization schemes for large firms has also moved 
slowly in Poland. Although Poland was the first country to begin grappling 
with the problems of mass privatization of large industry, it has been hampered 
by  political disputes as well as the complexities of  coordinating wide-scale 
distribution  and  management  of  ownership  claims  on  large  enterprises. 
Czechoslovakia, by  comparison, experienced less internal dispute within the 
federal government in the formulation of  a mass privatization program and 
as a consequence has already succeeded in promulgating a mass privatization 
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land almost surely have  given vested interests time to dig in further and to 
oppose a wide distribution of enterprise shares. 
The privatization of business and the growth of the private sector have oc- 
curred most rapidly in East Germany. The Treuhandanstalt (the agency charged 
with accomplishing the privatization and restructuring of East German enter- 
prises) has aggressively sold Eastern firms to West German companies. Wendy 
Carlin and Colin Mayer examine the activities and goals of the Treuhand. They 
articulate five functions that the Treuhand actually performs: valuation of en- 
terprises; liquidation and closure of uneconomic activities; creation of supervi- 
sory boards for ongoing concerns; selection and evaluation of prospective buy- 
ers; and negotiation of  purchase terms. In  many cases, the price a buyer is 
willing to pay for a firm  is less important to the Treuhand than are other non- 
price terms. Acquiring firms will often guarantee minimum levels of employ- 
ment and investment spending over time. In doing this, the Treuhand attempts 
to create freestanding enterprises that can obtain external financing without 
giving up control to foreigners. 
Carlin and Mayer also discuss what other East European countries might 
learn from the German experience. East Germany’s  rapid privatization is of 
course made possible by its close links with the West German commercial and 
financial infrastructure and made so pressing by the high level of East German 
wages established during unification. Carlin and Mayer argue that the Treu- 
hand’s interventionist  approach to privatization, which includes investment and 
corporate control, has some advantages over standard arm’s-length auctions of 
enterprises. Even before the enterprise is sold, the board of directors becomes 
active in establishing policies that keep the value of the enterprise from need- 
lessly declining. 
In the conference discussion of the Carlin and Mayer paper, several partici- 
pants stressed the important differences between East Germany and the rest 
of Eastern Europe, which limit the direct relevance to other countries of  the 
Treuhand’s experience. Most important, the Treuhand has relied on sales at low 
prices to West German enterprises. This is both politically and economically 
possible because, in such sales, the enterprise stays “within the family,” that is, 
in Germany. In the rest of Eastern Europe, there is no corresponding network of 
private firms willing and able to buy up the state industrial enterprises. More- 
over, as Carlin and Mayer make clear, the Treuhand approach has been enor- 
mously costly in many  cases, with large subsidies promised to prospective 
buyers.  Once  again,  such  largesse  would  be  crippling  in  the  financially 
strapped countries elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 
Designing Bankruptcy Rules 
One strength of the Treuhand’s interventionism is that it involves restructur- 
ing both sides of an enterprise’s balance sheet so that all financial claims are 
rationalized in the privatization process. Outside Germany, it will be common 
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debt burdens. It is likely that there will be a lot of  financial restructuring to 
do in the aftermath of privatization. And, as in the West, this will need to be 
accomplished through some form of bankruptcy proceeding. 
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart,  and John Moore examine the options that East 
European countries face in choosing bankruptcy rules. They argue that there 
are important flaws in currently used bankruptcy procedures such as Chapters 
7 and 11 in the United States or the receivership system in the United King- 
dom. They propose a new bankruptcy procedure that avoids some of the main 
pitfalls of  the existing procedures. In it, a bankruptcy judge allocates shares 
(and perhaps options to purchase shares) to enterprise claimants according to 
absolute priority. Next, shares are traded in an open market among claimants. 
The judge then solicits bids to purchase the enterprise, which the final share- 
holders vote on. Once the shareholders’ decision is made (they may choose not 
to sell the firm at all), the firm exits from bankruptcy. 
This kind of procedure has several advantages over standard bankruptcy pro- 
ceedings. First, unlike existing procedures in the West, implementing it would 
not require a large number of experienced and specialized bankruptcy judges 
and lawyers. Judges and lawyers do not need to get involved with how  the 
firm is run during bankruptcy as long as creditors and shareholders follow the 
procedure. Second, the bids to purchase the firm can be evaluated by outside 
or inside consultants engaged by  the ultimate  shareholders. Third, there is 
some leeway in how the equity-allocation rules are designed. One disadvantage 
of  this approach is that creditors would need to understand the enterprise’s 
business well enough to act intelligently. This may  be a problem in Eastern 
Europe, where the largest creditor is often a national bank with little or  no 
expertise in industrial oversight or in making valuations of  enterprises (and, 
perhaps, without the proper incentives to carry out these tasks). Nevertheless, 
the lack of financial and bankruptcy expertise in Eastern Europe will hinder 
any bankruptcy policy. 
Nurturing the Growth of  the Private Sector 
Of  crucial importance to the success of reform is the emergence of a new 
private sector. Simon Johnson’s paper looks at the growth of private-sector ac- 
tivity in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The growth of  private-sector 
activities is probably the most rapid in Poland, and in some sectors privately 
owned activities are already the dominant ownership form. Even though there 
are relatively  few  remaining barriers (e.g.,  tax, export-import, foreign ex- 
change) to private activity, private businesses remain small in size. One prob- 
lem may be a lack of bank-borrowing opportunities, on which small Western 
firms are highly dependent for growth. East European firms can often grow 
only as fast as they can retain earnings. 
Johnson also points to some country-specific differences in the growth of 
private business. Poland’s private sector has developed more quickly than Hun- 
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activity has been growing steadily in Hungary over the past decade, in Poland 
the liberalization of 1990 generated a surge of activity so large that Poland has 
surpassed Hungary in total small-firm private activity. This suggests that  a 
poorly developed private sector does not constitute a valid argument against 
rapid transition. 
Fostering Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade 
With the radical transformation of these economies has come a wave of in- 
terest by  both countries and companies in inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI). But relatively few large deals have been finalized, and today it looks 
unlikely that foreign direct investment will provide substantial net capital in- 
flows. The major problem confronting countries is to find a way to lower the 
costs of involving foreigners in the privatization process. 
Kenneth Froot’s paper looks at the costs of getting foreigners involved in the 
privatization process and in how countries have attempted to lower these costs. 
In many cases, complex rules and changing tax laws and property rights make 
it extremely time consuming and costly for foreign firms to consider invest- 
ment seriously. Froot traces out developments in Poland’s treatment of FDI that 
are the result of the authorities’ attempts to cut down on these costs of explora- 
tion and establishment. 
The paper also looks more theoretically at how entry costs to FDI can seri- 
ously impair the ability of countries to obtain competitive prices for enterprises 
being privatized. Froot then explores a number of ways that countries can im- 
prove their bargaining power. He finds that it is probably much better for coun- 
tries to invoke a kind of two-step process, in which assets are first privatized 
to dispersed groups of domestic investors and then sold to foreigners later. 
The reforms in Eastern Europe brought with them two major changes for 
trade. First, the macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization programs in the 
East led to radically different price structures, to large exchange rate devalua- 
tions, and to an opening of borders. Second, trade among Eastern bloc coun- 
tries institutionalized in the CMEA collapsed. Both these shocks had major 
effects on both East European terms of trade and the level of trade. 
Dani Rodrik’s paper investigates the effects of the transition on Eastem Eu- 
rope’s  foreign trade. He looks at Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland and 
finds that all three have achieved a substantial degree of openness to foreign 
trade. In all three countries, trade is now demonopolized, and licensing and 
quotas play a very small role. Exchange controls have virtually disappeared for 
current account transactions. Judging by partner statistics, export performance 
has been impressive in all three countries, and import booms are under way in 
at least Hungary and Poland as well. Rodrik finds that the export growth in the 
West is not simply a shift from the Soviet market to the West European market. 
On the whole, it seems that, in the first stages of adjustment, former exporters 
to the Soviet market have not had much success in finding new  sales in the 
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exporting in the West or that are shifting from domestic markets to Western 
markets. 
The collapse of  the CMEA represents a significant shock, amounting to a 
loss of real income of 3-4  percent of GDP in Poland and 7-8  percent of GDP 
in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Export performance can be attributed to 
exchange rate policy in part, but the collapse of domestic demand has possibly 
played an even more important role. Finally, Rodrik suggests that trade liberal- 
ization in the first year or two after the start of  reforms appears to have had 
little effect on internal price discipline, in large part because of the substantial 
devaluations that have  accompanied it. This will likely change, however, as 
currencies appreciate in real terms following the initial large devaluations. 